Patterns
OWASP Risk Mapping
Guardrails ACS / OWASP Risk Mapping

Mapping ACS Controls to the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (2026)

This is the part that turns ACS from an abstract architecture into an actual guardrails program: which control addresses which cataloged risk.

The ten risks below (ASI01–ASI10) are OWASP’s; the mapping to ACS controls is this guide’s synthesis, meant as a starting point for your own risk-to-control matrix.


The Risk-to-Control Mapping

RiskOne-line definitionPrimary ACS control(s)How it helps
ASI01 β€” Agent Goal HijackAttacker-supplied content redirects the agent’s objectiveUser Message hook, Knowledge Retrieval hook, Guardian Agent policyEvery piece of inbound content is treated as untrusted at the point it enters context, giving the Guardian Agent a chance to deny or rewrite it before the planner acts on it
ASI02 β€” Tool Misuse & ExploitationA legitimate tool is used in an unsafe or unintended wayTool Call Request hookEvery tool call is evaluated against policy before it executes; the Guardian Agent can deny it or narrow the parameters
ASI03 β€” Agent Identity & Privilege AbuseThe agent operates with more privilege than intended, or inherits a user’s identityTier 3 enterprise classifiers, Trace identity fields, the emerging identity workstreamRuntime enforcement plus an audit trail that ties each action to a specific, scoped identity rather than a borrowed session
ASI04 β€” Agentic Supply Chain VulnerabilitiesNew tools, MCP servers, or dependencies discovered at runtime introduce riskInspect / dynamic AgBOM, MCP Outbound hookEvery new component the agent adopts is captured in the AgBOM and can be checked against policy; the outbound MCP hook can gate connections to unapproved servers
ASI05 β€” Unexpected Code ExecutionNatural-language paths trigger unintended code executionTool Call Request hook (for code-exec/OS tools), Tier 3 classifiersCode-execution calls pass through the same allow/deny/modify gate as any other tool call
ASI06 β€” Memory & Context PoisoningLong-term memory or retrieved content is manipulated to reshape future behaviorMemory Context Retrieval, Memory Store, Knowledge Retrieval hooksBoth the write path and the read path for memory and knowledge are inspectable and individually gate-able
ASI07 β€” Insecure Inter-Agent CommunicationSpoofed or manipulated messages between agents in a multi-agent systemA2A hooksDelegation, cancellation, and status messages all pass through the Guardian Agent for authentication and authorization
ASI08 β€” Cascading FailuresAn error or compromise in one agent propagates through a connected systemTrace (OpenTelemetry/OCSF), A2A hooksA full cross-agent trace makes propagation visible in near real time; hooks let you contain a failing agent before it fans out further
ASI09 β€” Human-Agent Trust ExploitationConfident, polished agent output manipulates a human into an unsafe approvalAgent Response hookThe Guardian Agent can flag, modify, or hold a response that matches a risk pattern before a human ever sees it
ASI10 β€” Rogue AgentsAn agent operates outside policy through compromise, drift, or design failureThe full Instrument + Trace + Inspect stackThe closest thing ACS offers to a kill switch: deny at any hook, reconstruct behavior from trace, and pull a compromised component from the AgBOM

Detailed Analysis by Risk

ASI01 β€” Agent Goal Hijack

The Risk: Attacker-supplied content redirects the agent’s objective

ACS Controls:

  • User Message hook β€” filters inbound prompts for injection patterns
  • Knowledge Retrieval hook β€” screens retrieved content for manipulative instructions
  • Guardian Agent policy β€” evaluates context for goal-redirection attempts

How It Helps: Every piece of inbound content is treated as untrusted at the point it enters context. The Guardian Agent can:

  • Deny obviously malicious inputs
  • Modify suspicious inputs to remove injection attempts
  • Allow clean inputs to proceed

Implementation Notes:

  • Start with known injection patterns (prompt injection, jailbreaks)
  • Add policy rules for out-of-scope topic detection
  • Monitor for false positives in legitimate user requests

ASI02 β€” Tool Misuse & Exploitation

The Risk: A legitimate tool is used in an unsafe or unintended way

ACS Controls:

  • Tool Call Request hook β€” evaluates tool calls before execution
  • Parameter inspection β€” checks tool parameters, not just tool names
  • Tier 3 classifiers β€” industry-specific tool usage rules

How It Helps: Every tool call is evaluated against policy before it executes:

  • Deny high-risk calls (e.g., database deletion without approval)
  • Modify parameters to narrow scope (e.g., limit query results)
  • Allow safe calls to proceed

Implementation Notes:

  • Don’t just inspect tool names β€” check parameters
  • Implement parameter-level validation for high-impact tools
  • Require approval for destructive actions

ASI03 β€” Agent Identity & Privilege Abuse

The Risk: The agent operates with more privilege than intended, or inherits a user’s identity

ACS Controls:

  • Tier 3 enterprise classifiers β€” organizational identity and access rules
  • Trace identity fields β€” audit trail tying actions to specific identities
  • Emerging identity workstream β€” non-human agent authentication

How It Helps: Runtime enforcement plus an audit trail:

  • Enforce scoped identities per agent or session
  • Track which identity performed each action
  • Audit privilege usage patterns over time

Implementation Notes:

  • Implement just-in-time access credentials
  • Use scoped identities rather than borrowing user sessions
  • Monitor for privilege escalation patterns

ASI04 β€” Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

The Risk: New tools, MCP servers, or dependencies discovered at runtime introduce risk

ACS Controls:

  • Inspect / dynamic AgBOM β€” tracks all agent components
  • MCP Outbound hook β€” gates connections to MCP servers
  • Component approval policy β€” checks new components against allow-lists

How It Helps: Every new component is captured and checked:

  • Detect when an agent connects to a new MCP server
  • Block connections to unapproved servers
  • Audit component changes over time

Implementation Notes:

  • Maintain an approved component list
  • Implement real-time AgBOM updates
  • Require approval for new MCP server connections

ASI05 β€” Unexpected Code Execution

The Risk: Natural-language paths trigger unintended code execution

ACS Controls:

  • Tool Call Request hook β€” applies to code-execution tools
  • Tier 3 classifiers β€” industry-specific code execution rules
  • Parameter validation β€” inspects generated code before execution

How It Helps: Code-execution calls pass through the same gate as other tools:

  • Deny obviously malicious code
  • Modify code to add safety checks
  • Require approval for high-risk operations

Implementation Notes:

  • Treat code-execution tools as high-risk
  • Implement sandboxing for code execution
  • Require human approval for system-level operations

ASI06 β€” Memory & Context Poisoning

The Risk: Long-term memory or retrieved content is manipulated to reshape future behavior

ACS Controls:

  • Memory Context Retrieval hook β€” screens memory reads
  • Memory Store hook β€” screens memory writes
  • Knowledge Retrieval hook β€” screens knowledge source access

How It Helps: Both read and write paths are inspectable:

  • Block poisoned content from being written to memory
  • Screen memory reads for suspicious patterns
  • Audit memory access patterns over time

Implementation Notes:

  • Gate both write and read paths
  • Implement memory content validation
  • Consider one-time memory audits for existing data

ASI07 β€” Insecure Inter-Agent Communication

The Risk: Spoofed or manipulated messages between agents in a multi-agent system

ACS Controls:

  • A2A hooks β€” task delegation, cancellation, status messages
  • Authentication policies β€” verify agent identities
  • Authorization rules β€” enforce inter-agent permissions

How It Helps: All inter-agent communication passes through Guardian Agent:

  • Authenticate message sources
  • Authorize task delegations
  • Audit inter-agent communication patterns

Implementation Notes:

  • Implement agent-to-agent authentication
  • Define authorization rules for task delegation
  • Monitor for suspicious communication patterns

ASI08 β€” Cascading Failures

The Risk: An error or compromise in one agent propagates through a connected system

ACS Controls:

  • Trace (OpenTelemetry/OCSF) β€” cross-agent observability
  • A2A hooks β€” contain failing agents
  • Circuit breaker policies β€” stop propagation

How It Helps: Full cross-agent trace plus containment:

  • Detect failure propagation in real time
  • Contain failing agents before they affect others
  • Reconstruct failure chains for post-mortem analysis

Implementation Notes:

  • Implement circuit breakers for agent interactions
  • Monitor for error propagation patterns
  • Define containment policies for different failure modes

ASI09 β€” Human-Agent Trust Exploitation

The Risk: Confident, polished agent output manipulates a human into an unsafe approval

ACS Controls:

  • Agent Response hook β€” screens outbound responses
  • Risk pattern detection β€” identifies manipulative content
  • Response modification β€” adds warnings or holds suspicious responses

How It Helps: Guardian Agent can intervene before human sees response:

  • Flag responses that match risk patterns
  • Modify responses to add safety warnings
  • Hold responses requiring human review

Implementation Notes:

  • Implement response risk scoring
  • Define patterns for manipulative content
  • Require human approval for high-risk responses

ASI10 β€” Rogue Agents

The Risk: An agent operates outside policy through compromise, drift, or design failure

ACS Controls:

  • Full Instrument + Trace + Inspect stack β€” complete visibility
  • Deny at any hook β€” kill switch capability
  • AgBOM component removal β€” disable compromised components

How It Helps: The closest thing ACS offers to a kill switch:

  • Deny actions at any hook point
  • Reconstruct behavior from trace data
  • Remove compromised components from AgBOM

Implementation Notes:

  • Implement emergency stop procedures
  • Maintain trace data for incident response
  • Define component revocation processes

Building Your Risk-to-Control Matrix

This mapping is a starting point. Build your own matrix by:

  1. Assess your agent estate β€” which ASI risks are most plausible given what your agents do?
  2. Prioritize hook coverage β€” focus on controls that address your highest-risk scenarios
  3. Map to regulatory requirements β€” connect ASI risks to compliance obligations
  4. Test and validate β€” verify controls effectively mitigate identified risks
  5. Iterate and update β€” refine the matrix as your agent estate evolves

Key Takeaways

  1. ACS provides controls for all ASI risks β€” each OWASP risk maps to specific ACS hooks and policies
  2. Instrument provides the control points β€” hooks at every decision point enable risk mitigation
  3. Trace provides the evidence β€” audit trails support incident response and compliance
  4. Inspect provides the inventory β€” AgBOM tracks components that could introduce risk
  5. Build your own matrix β€” use this mapping as a starting point for your risk-to-control analysis

Next Steps

  • Implementation Guide β€” follow the step-by-step process to implement controls for your risks
  • Governance Checklist β€” assess your maturity in addressing ASI risks